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Case No. 8459 
DEER TRAIL MINES, 1 r : r··.J- 7 1 c; r~7 .. _ - . , ·-IV 
Plaintiff and Respondent;··--- --,-~·.::. · ---------------- ------------------·······--·--
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and 
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1Jn tqr ~uprrmr Qlnurt 
of t}Jr ~tatr of lltn}J 
DEER TRAIL :MINES, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
LOUIS C. DELUKE, 
Defendant and .Appellant, 
and Case No. 8459 
LOUIS C. DELUKE, 
Plaintiff and .Appellant, 
vs. 
JOHN W. WILHELM, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
PRELIMINARY STA'TEMENT 
Throughout this brief Louis C. Deluke, defendant 
and appellant, shall be referred to as "Appellant" or 
Deluke and plaintiff and respondents will be referred 
to either by name or as "Respondents." 
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This appeal arises out of a judgment entered by 
the Seventh Judicial District Court in and for Piute 
County on the 20th day of September, 1955 in favor 
of the Respondents and against the appellant. The judg-
ment required certain acts on the part of the Respondents 
and granted judgment against the Appellant for the sum 
of $32,347.92. The decree appears in the record of the 
trial Court and has no numbered page. In the original 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree there 
were certain blanks which were left unfilled by the Trial 
Court at the time of the entry of the Decree, thereafter, 
on the 3rd of March, 1956 a hearing was had and follow-
ing said hearing an Order was n1ade, dated the 3rd of 
March, 1956, in which the blanks left in the original 
Findings of Fact, Conclu.sions of Law and Decree were 
filled in and the Judgment was amended upward to 
include a Judgment against the Appellant for the sum 
of $33,999.42. 
From the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Decree Appellant has prosecuted this appeal. 
Respondents cannot agree with the Statement of 
Facts as set forth in the Brief of Appellant, such state-
lnent, in the opinion of Respondents, is neither fair nor 
accurate nor does it present a proper picture of the case 
now on appeal to this Court. 
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STATE1IENT OF ],ACTS 
This Appeal grows out of relations created between 
the Respondents and Appellant by two agreements. The 
agreements are both dated 11th of February, 1952. They 
provided for the settlement of certain disputes between 
the parties and the transfer to Appellant of certain stock 
of Deer Trail Mines, the sale to hi1n of additional prop-
erty by Deer Trail Mines and John W. Wilhelm. The 
agreements are marked Exhibits 8-A and A. 
The Exhibit marked 8-A has been fully performed 
and executed by all of the parties. It was an agreement 
which called for the transfer of certain stock to the 
Appellant and a dismissal of a pending legal action in the 
District Court of the United States for the District of 
Utah, Central Division. Exhibit "A" provided for the 
purchase by Appellant from Deer Trail Mines of certain 
real property which it owned, corporate stock of Rainbo 
Gold Mines, a corporation of Delaware and certain ac-
counts receivable, which were payable by Rainbo Gold 
~:fines. 
In the Statement of Facts contained on page 4 of the 
Brief of Appellant there is in the first sentence a state-
ment that the controversies in this Appeal grow out of 
a breach of the agreements of February 11, 1952. The 
breach claimed by Appellant is on the part of Deer Trail 
Mines. This statement is false. There was no finding 
at any time made by the Trial Court that Deer Trail 
Mines did not carry out all of the terms of both agree-
ments which were incumbent upon it. 
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The breach which Appellant claims occurred con-
cerned a Quit Claim of 41,000 shares of stock of Rainbo. 
It was repeatedly stipulated and agreed between the 
parties during the trial that all of the other obligations 
on the part of Deer Trail and 'Vilhelm had been com-
pletely performed by them and the only breach claimed 
by Appellant concerned the Quit Claim Deed to him of 
41,000 shares. At page 56 of the transcript of the testi-
mony the following appears: 
"BY !tiR. PACE : We are willing to stipulate 
that the Deer Trail ~fines at the present time and 
at the time of the notice to quit has complied with 
all obligations except they technically question 
Paragraph C which is for 41,000 shares of stock 
and .show that they are not in default. We are 
willing to stipulate to these other things, but 
we are wasting alot of time." 
And again at page 57 it was further stipulated as follows: 
"BY ~fR. PACE: Your Honor, we are willing 
to stipulate that they have complied with the 
agreement in Paragraph A, B, D, and F, which 
were in default on May 15, 1953 but they had .!!Qt 
cQmplied with Paragraph C.. and we are going 
through material admitted by the Defense and I 
see no purpose in'it; but we are willing to stipulate 
as to Paragraph A, B, D, and F." 
Concerning the 41,000 shares of Rainbo Gold stock 
the Trial Court made the following findings : 
"1. The court finds that the Deer Trail 
Mines has performed all of the conditions and 
obligations encu1nbered upon it and which grow 
out of that certain contract dated the 11th day of 
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February, 1953, and duly executed by the parties 
thereto which are the Deer 'Trail Mines and Louis 
C. Deluke with the exception of the quit claim deed 
for 41,000 shares of stock of the Rainbo Gold 
Mines Corporation of Delaware which was re-
quired by subdivision (c) of paragraph 4 of said 
contract. That as to said deed the court finds 
that it was executed and tendered by Deer Trail) 
Mines to Louis C. Deluke but said tender was ' 
reje~ted for the reason thaf the stock coUld not 
be l enb£1 a hA 00 S and records o!:the Ram~o Gol~\,ijl~e: ci!LV:tign Qf Delawaie. 
2. The court further finds that the parties 
agreed that the reasonable value of the Rainbo 
Gold Mines Corporation of Delaware stock was 
the sum of ten cents per share. That Deer Trail 
J\1ines and John W. Wilhelm as an individual and 
Louis C. Deluke believed that there was approxi-
mately 41,000 shares of stock of Rainbo Gold 
Mines Corporation of Delaware standing in the 
nrune of Patrick T. Henry on the books and rec-
ords of the Rainbo Gold Mines Corporation of 
Delaware. That said 41,000 shares constituted a 
duplication of a portion of the stock which was in 
escrow in the State of Delaware and was referred 
to by the terms of paragraph 5 (d) of the Febru-
ary 11, 1952, contract, the duplicate stock being 
certificate No. 579 for 19,250 shares and certifi-
cate No. 577 for 18,450 shares." 
At no place in the Findings of Fact, Conclus~ons of 
Law and Decree did the Court ever find that there had 
r~ been a breach of contract by Deer Trail or by Wilhelm. 
l: The Court, in attempting to reach an equitable result 
f placed a greater burden on the Respondents than they 
~i 
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had assumed under the agreement and so stated in his 
memorandum decision. The concluding paragraph of said 
decision reads as follows: 
"While the foregoing decision casts a greater 
burden on the Deer Trail ~fines and John W. Wil-
helm than they contracted for had they been able 
to show the 41,000 shares questioned on the bocks 
of the company the making up of said shares is in 
the Court's opinion not unreasonable compensa-
tion to Deluke for their inability to do so. \V e are 
compelled to seek some sort of practical solution." 
The provision of Exhibit A, which covered the quit 
claiming of 41,000 shares of capital stock of Rainbo 
Gold l\1:ines to the appellant reads as follows: 
"5(c) To quit claim to purchaser on the 
lOth day of 1\iay, 1952, Forty-one Thousand shares 
of the capital stock of the Rainbo Gold Mines 
Corp., shown on the books of said corporation 
as the property of Patrick T. Henry. Y endor 
represents that this Forty-one Thousand shares 
was assigned to ·vendor by Daisy W. Henry, 
executrix of the Estate of Patrick T. Henry and 
will warrant title to said stock against all acts 
.affecting title to said stock by ·vendor or Daisy 
W. Henry." 
At the time the negotiations were going forward 
between the parties and whirh ulti1nately lead up to the 
signing of Exhibit A it was discovered by \Yilhelm that 
there was 41,000 shares of stock shown on the books 
of Rainbo Gold ::Mines Corporation of Delaware as prop-
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erty of Patrick T. Henry. However, no certificates were 
in the hands of Patrick T. Henry or his ,administratrix, 
Daisy W. Henry (R. 76, 77 and 78). 
When it was discovered that the certificates were 
not available the Respondents then refused to agree to 
deliver the stock and to warrant its title, but, only agreed 
that they would quit claim whatever interest they had in 
the 41,000 shares of stock shown on the books as the 
property of Patrick T. Henry. 
After all of the certificates had been identified it 
was discovered that 37,700 shares of stock which was 
shown as the property of Patrick T. Henry was a part of 
the stock which was in escrow with the Securities Com-
mission of the State of Delaware (R. 80 and 81). 
t No evidence was ever produced that any act of the 
administratrix of the Estate of Patrick T. I-Ienry, namely, 
Daisy W. Henry, or Deer Trail Mines or John W. Wil-
helm had in any way created, a cloud in the titles to the 
41,000 shares of stock. 
Demand was made upon Respondents that they 
identify the 41,000 shares of stock for which the quit 
claim deed had been tendered. At the time this demand 
was made the books and records of Rainbo were in the 
hands of Appellant. The stock was identified. It was 
revealed that there was a duplication in the stock. 37,700 
shares was stock in the hands of the Securities Com-
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mission of the State of Delaware under an agreement 
between Patrick T. Henry and said Securities 
Commission. 
Witness, Lucy Deluke, had assisted the Appellant in 
his negotiations of the two agreements. Miss Deluke 
testified that she had received two years legal training 
and was familiar with legal terms especially those which 
were used in the conveyance of real property (R. 292, 
293). The two agreements were the results of several 
days of negotiations and offers back and forth by all 
parties (R. 294). Miss Deluke had a power of attorney 
from Louis Deluke and acted under it for him on numer-
ous occasions (R. 293). It was her opinion of Louis C. 
Deluke as follows : 
"I consider Mr. Deluke as sort of a lawyer 
himself with informal training" (R. 293). 
There was no finding by the Trial Court that either 
the Appellant or the Respondents 1nisunderstood the na-
ture of a quit claim deed. 
The consideration for the transfer to Appellant of 
the re.al property and stock owned by Respondents was 
payment in accordance with a paJinent schedule shown 
on page 2 of Exhibit "A." The payment schedule re-
quired the payment by Appellant of $15,000.00 on or 
before the lOth day of 1\{ay, 1952. The second payment 
of $10,000.00 on or before the lOth day of February, 
1953. The payments were not made in accordance with 
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Exhibit "A." Agreements were made giving Appellant 
additional time to make the $15,000.00, payment (see Ex-
hibit No. 10). 
At the time of trial a total of $15,050.00 had been 
paid by Appellant. At that time if th~".Jq1l terms of the 
- - . . 
agreemen~t ... ~-<be.en ... m~eLhy.....A,:ppellant there would have 
b~d an additional $33,999.42:___.. ---.. .., 
~ --~- .,.,______~-~- __ , 
The Court's decision granted to ... -\ppellant the alter-
native of paying the sum of $33,999.42 or surrendering 
the premise.s within thirty days from the date of the 
Court's decision. 
In the trial it had been repeatedly stated that the 
Appellant was ready, willing and able to pay the defici-
encies on the contract upon the performance by plaintiff 
(R. 290). 
Following the decision of the Trial Court the Re-
spondents attempted to obtain a certificate for stock from 
the Rainbo. It was under complete control of the Appel-
lant. Appellant refused to sign the certificate as Presi-
dent of Rainbo. An assignment of the stock which w.as 
shown on the books and records of the corporation as 
the property of Wilhelm was made. This assignment 
covered 19,056 shares of stock of Rainbo. It is in the file 
of the transcript of this case. Deer Trail executed and 
delivered to the Court a memorandum of credit which 
gave credit to Appellant for the sum of $2,194.40. From 
February 11, 1952 to the time of trial Appellant has been 
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president of Rainbo and has exercised absolute control 
over the affairs of the corporation. The only danger to 
control was created by the giving to \Vilhehn of a proxy 
to vote 408,000 shares of stock in Rainbo. The Trial 
Court restrained Respondent from voting the stock so 
long as the Appellant performed his obligations under 
the agreements. The only stock of Rainbo which Appel-
lant owned at the time of trial was a certificate which 
had been delivered to him after his payments of the 
$15,000.00 due under the contract. It was in the amount 
of 55,702 shares. This certificate represents more stock 
than Appellant is entitled to under the terms of the 
agreement. 
No payment.s have been made since trial. No super-
sedeas bond has been posted. 
ARGU~IEXT 
POINT I 
THE COURT DID NOT FIND THAT DEER TRAIL 
MINES HAD EVER FAILED TO PERFORM ANY OF THE 
OBLIGATIONS INCUMBENT UPON IT UNDER THE TERMS 
OF THE AGREEMENT, EXHIBIT "A." 
Throughout the brief of ~\ ppellant he has stated re-
peatedly that the Court found that the Deer Trail failed 
to perform the terms and conditions of the Agreement 
of February 11, 195~, 1narked Exhibit "A.'' There ·was no 
such finding. The finding that the Court 1nade has been 
quoted in the State1nent of Facts and shows exactly what 
tile Court had in n1ind. Deer Trail only agreed to quit 
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of R.ainbo stock. It tendered such a quit claim deed but 
the deed was refused by Appellant. rr~he Court found that 
the basis of his refusal to accept the quit claim deed was 
that the stock could not be identified on the books of 
the Rainbo. 
The testimony of Respondent, John W. Wilhelm, was 
clear. It is substantial evidence which would support th0 
findings of the Court .and his judgrnent. He stated that 
originally it was contemplated that the Deer Trail inter-
ests would transfer to Appellant 440,006 shares of Rain-
bo stock. However, prior to the time that the agreement 
of February 11, 1952 was signed it was discovered that 
.. no certificates were available (R. 78). There can be no 
possible doubt about the accuracy of Wilhelm's recollec-
tion, a memorandum was produced by the Appellant him-
self. It was marked defendant's Exhibit "B." This Ex-
hibit was typed up by the witness, Lucy Deluke, and has 
been a part of the Appellant's records. The exhibit 
)fiE 
shows that originally there w.as contemplated the transfer 
of 440,006 shares of Rainbo stock. 
Respondents discovered that there were not certifi-
cates sufficient to guarantee the delivery of 440,000 
shares of the Rainbo stock. A change was made in the 
basic .agreement. The number of shares which were 
guaranteed cut from 440,000 to 400,000, the difference of 
41,000 the Respondents then agreed to quit claim to 
Appellant (R. 78). The price wa.s reduced from $103,-
000.00 to $99,000.00. 
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The record of the trial shows that all parties were 
conscious of the fact that the Respondents could not 
accurately state where the 41,000 shares of stock shown 
to be in the name of Patrick T. Henry actually could be 
found. It was, of course, possible that the stock had been 
endorsed in blank and sold by Henry prior to his death. 
If such were true then, of course, the interest of Deer 
Trail could not be greater than Henry's own interest .and 
the quit claim would not carry any property. Or, as 
it ultimately turned out the 41,000 shares of stock shown 
to be in the name of Patrick T. Henry might be duplica-
tions. 37,700 shares of the 41,000 shares shown to be in 
the name of Patrick T. Henry was actually in escrow with 
the Securities Commission of Delaware. This fact was 
not known at the time of the Agreement. 
In February, 1952 the records of the Rainbo were 
not completely examined by Respondents and apparently 
were not completely examined by Appellant. The records 
were available to all parties but none of the Respondents 
nor Appellant were officers, directors or in any way 
vitally concerned in the affairs of Rainbo. 
The books, record.s and property of Rainbo were 
turned over to Appellant shortly after February 11,1952. 
He placed the records in the hands of ~Ir. Hal Taylor, 
an attorney at law. He carefully examined the records 
and began a tracing procedure to discover just where the 
stock which was on the records of the corporation actually 
was. As a result of his re.search a number of the shares 
of stock which had been in the nan1e of Deer Trail were 
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rejected. There were de.fect.s 1n the endorsements and 
1llih: transfers on the books and records of Rainbo. The re-
jected stock is a part of the record before this Court 
marked Exhibit "E." Attached to the stock certificates 
is the letter from Taylor showing his objections. The 
total amount of stock which Taylor concluded was not 
in the name of Deer Trail was 16,515 shares. This stock 
m;~ was a part of the stock that Respondents had counted 
~r,1 upon in calculating their ability to deliver 400,000 shares 
rw~u of the Rainbo stock. Respondent, Wilhelm, thereafter 
a~~ took out of his own personal holdings in Rainbo sufficient 
~~~J~ shares to make up the rejected 16,000 shares. 
It was only after the careful study by Taylor that 
the fact came to light that 37,700 shares of the stock 
shown in the name of Patrick T. Henry wa.s stock which 
was in escrow with the Securities Commission of the 
State of Delaware. 
A quit claim deed from Deer Trail to Deluke was 
prepared and was delivered to T.aylor as counsel for 
Deluke, a copy of the quit claim is Exhibit 8. The quit 
claim is in accordance with the terms of the Agreement 
Exhibit "A." It was rejected by Appellant upon the 
grounds and for the reason that Respondents could not 
identify the stock on the books of the Rainbo. By the 
time the quit claim was delivered it had been revealed 
that a portion of the stock standing in Patrick T. Henry's 
name was actually in escrow in Delaware with the Securi-
ties Commission. This fact was then known to Appellant. 
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At the time he had the books and record.s of Rainbo in his 
hands and had actually done the research necessary to 
discover and trace out the location of all of the stock 
shown on the books and records to be outstanding. Any 
attempt to claim that he was prejudiced by the failure of 
Respondents to be able to identify stock which was only 
subject to a quit claim deed is completely facetious. 
The affidavit of Wilhelm which appears in the rec-
ords of the Lower Court reveals that he attempted to 
obtain a certificate of stock for 19,056 shares of Rainbo 
which was shown to be in his name. Deluke, refused to 
sign the certificate. 
The Trial Court recognized that in requiring Re-
spondents to make up the difference between 41,000 
shares and the actual stock available to Deer Trail for 
delivery under the quit claim deed he wa.s placing a 
greater burden on the Respondents than they had 
assumed under the agreement, Exhibit ''A." The effect 
of the Lower Court's decision was to place upon Re-
spondents the obligations of warranting the -!1,000 shares 
of Rainbo stock which it had only agreed to quit claim. 
The Court's .action in this regard could not be prejudicial 
to Appellant. He received in place of a disclaimer of 
interest a warrant of interest. 
Quit claim deeds, under the laws of the State of Utah, 
have a certain statutory effect. Section 57-1-13 sets forth 
the form of .a quit claim deed and then states that the 
effect of such deed is as follows: 
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"Such deed when executed as required by law 
shall have the effect of a conveyance of all right, 
title, interest and estate of the grantor in and to 
the premise.s therein described and all rights, 
privileges and .appurtenances thereunto belonging, 
at the date of such conveyance." 
Appellant got all of the right, title and interest of 
Respondents under the tendered quit claim deed, Ex-
hibit 8. 
Trial Court's determination that Deluke expected not 
only to get all of the interest of Deer Trail, Daisy W. 
Henry and Patrick T. Henry, but also all of the interest 
of Wilhelm, individually, in the Rainbo stock is an 
:]. interpretation of the two agreements most favorable to 
Appellant. Respondents believe that the instruments do 
not justify such an interpretation. The only prejudice 
that could be done by the Court's interpretation is to the 
Respondents. 
Respondents have .accepted the decision of the Court 
1; and have endeavored to comply with it in everyway pos-
~;; sible. 
Appellant complains in his brief that the fact that 
Deer Trail :Mines was not able to actuallyw.arrant the title 
and deliver the 41,000 share.s of stock which it quit 
claimed to him prejudices him in that he did not get the 
control over Rainbo which he desired. On February 11, 
1952 Deer Trail could not guarantee the -±1,000 shares of 
stock. This w.as known to Appellant. See Exhibit ''B." 
Even with the 41,000 shares of stock Deluke would not 
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have a rnajority of all of the stock of Rainbo. The second 
page of defendant's Exhibit "B" shows a breakdown of 
the .stock of Rainbo as of January 16, 1952. The break-
down reveals that Deluke owned only 118 shares person-
ally, the proxies which he had obtained enabled him to 
take over and control the corporation, prevent its con-
solidation with Deer Trail and have himself elected presi-
dent. 
Deluke now states on page 21 of his brief that he has 
purch.ased the Pluess certificate. There was no evidence 
whatsoever that the statement is true. 
Appellant seems to ignore the fact that while he 
could vote the stock which he had agreed to purchase 
from Respondents he did not own such stock until he had 
paid for it. His control of Rainbo depended absolutely 
upon his performance of the agreement .and he has failed 
to perform. 
A large part of the first point of Appellant's brief 
is concerned with the question of whether or not he would 
be entitled to specific performance of an agreement which 
involved the transfer of personal property. Appellant 
continually ignores in his brief the fact that all that he 
was entitled to is a quit claim deed to the interest of 
Deer Trail. Such a deed was tendered to him and re-
jected. l-Ie is not entitled to convert the agreement into 
a warranty deed requirement and then insist on specific 
performance under a warranty deed. Nothing in the 
Court's opinion or Findings of Fact could possibly be 
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stretched to show that the Court intended to require of 
Deer Trail Mines that it warrant the 41,000 shares of 
stock. 
The only way in which the -!-1,000 shares was required 
to be delivered was because of the agreement between 
Appellant and Wilhelm; it being the Court's interpreta-
tion of that agreement, Exhibit SA, that Deluke expected 
to have all of the interest of Wilhelm, and the Court, in 
~~~ order to be entirely fair, has required Wilhelm to convey 
all of his interest in Rainbo stock to the Appellant. 
POINT II 
NO OBLIGATION OTHER THAN THAT CONTAINED 
WITHIN THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT OF FEBRU-
ARY 11, 1952, EXHIBIT "A," WERE IMPOSED UPON 
APPELLANT. 
Point II of Appellant's brief claims that there were 
obligations imposed upon Deluke which were not con-
templated by the parties. The careful examination of the 
agreements and the Court's Findings of Fact and Con-
clusions of Law will not justify the claimed .addition to 
the agreement as set forth on page 22 of Appellant's brief. 
There was a finding that an equitable solution of the 
problems arising out of the two contracts would require 
that Deer Trail obt.ain for Appellant the stock of Wil-
helm and for all shortages of the 41,000 shares which it 
had agreed to quit claim an allowance of 10c per share 
be made. The value placed on the stock was a value used 
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by all parties in drafting of the agreements. The actual 
finding of the Court is contained in paragraph 3 of the 
Findings of Fact at page 2 .and reads as follows: 
"3. The court finds that it was the desire of 
Louis C. Deluke to obtain through the contract of 
February 11, 1952 all of the stock of Deer Trail 
Mines and John \V. Wilhelm in the Rainbo Gold 
Mines Corporation of Delaware but the contract 
does not provide for the transfer of stock per-
sonally owned by .John Vv. Wilhelm to Louis C. 
Deluke. The court finds that an equitable solution 
to the present disputes between the parties to this 
suit should require that Deer Trail Mines obtain 
for Louis C. Deluke all stock o"rned personally by 
John Vv. \Vilhehn and that such stock should be 
credited against the shortage created by the dupli-
cation of certificate No. 579 and No. 577. That if 
the stock thus obtained by Deer Trail ~Iine_s does 
not amount to or exceed 41,000 shares then and 
in that event the court finds that an equitable 
solution should require Deer Trail niines to credit 
Louis C. Deluke on the payrnents due under the 
contract of February 11, 1952, with the sum of ten 
cents per share on each share which Deer Trail 
Mines shall be deficient in providing a total of 
41,000 shares under the provisions of subdivision 
of paragraph 4 of the contract of February 11, 
1952." 
The figure of 10c per share is .a reasonable sum 
to allo·w Appellant as a credit against the balances owing 
to Respondent, Deer Trail. 
Defendant's Exhibit "B" shows that at the time the 
settlmnent agree1nent was under di.scussion there was 
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an .agreement that Rainbo stock was to be sold to Deluke 
for lOc a share. This is the Appellant's own document 
and certainly he should not be permitted to now say that 
he did not assign the lOc per share value to the Rainbo 
stock. Respondent, Wilhelm, likewise stated in his testi-
mony that he assigned a value of lOc .a share to the 
Rainbo stock. At page 310 of the transcript of testimony 
the discussions leading up to the execution of the agree-
ment, Exhibit 8A, was fully set forth by Wilhelm. He 
discusses the way that 400,000 shares of stock was 
arrived at and the .allowance made to Deluke of $4,000.00 
when it was discovered that the original amount of stock 
contemplated to he transferred to Deluke could not be 
accurately and absolutely determined by Deer Trail. 
There was no evidence offered by Appellant indicat-
ing that the Rainbo stock had some other value or that 
there was ever a market which would establish a reason-
able market value. 
The Court's finding is based upon the evidence of 
both parties. It is practically undisputed that the reason-
able value for the R.ainbo stock is lOc a share. 
The subdivision which eommences on page 26 of 
Appellant's brief sets up a straw man to the effect that 
there was no agreement as to liquidated damages based 
upon a reasonable value figure of lOc per share. The 
Court's Findings were not based upon any idea that he 
was awarding damages, his whole concept of the rnatter 
was that there should be some kind of allowance made 
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to Deluke because he believed that he was actually getting 
41,000 shares of Rainbo stock when as an actual fact that 
stock could not be delivered by Deer Trail. The Court 
was under no misconception concerning the nature of the 
agreement, Exhibit "A." He knew that all that Deer 
Trail actually and legally was required to do was give 
whatever stock Deer Trail or W elhelm personally had 
offered to do just that. The Court, however, believed that 
whatever stock Deer Tr.ail or Wilhelm personally had 
should be transferred to Deluke so that he could have 
all of the stock there was available. He stated in the 
Findings that in order to do equity he is placing a more 
burdensome requirement on the Respondents than the 
contract itself places on them. Appellant should not be 
able to come to this Court and complain because the 
Lower Court placed upon Respondents a greater burden 
than they has assumed under their solemn obligations. 
( Respondents might agree with the statement of 
Appellant that the Court rewrote the provisions of Ex-
hibit "A." But the rewriting that the Court indulged in 
was in no way prejudicial to Appellant. If any one was 
prejudice the Respondents were prejudiced. But, Respon-
dent.s do not complain about the matter, they are willing 
to accept the additional burdens placed upon them by the 
Court's Decree in order that there be no doubt concerning 
their willingness to do all in their power to perform 
the obligations of their agreement and go one step further 
and do whatever in equity and good conscience the 
Court felt they should do. 
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The last complaint that the Appellant has to make 
concerning the Court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
L.aw and Decree concern the requirement that the Court 
made that if the Respondents complied with all of the 
Court's orders then the Appellant would have thirty days 
in which to make up the payments in which he was 1n 
arrears. 
The chief complaint of Appellant seems to be that 
the thirty day period w.as not a fair time for him to per-
form in. 
The Court chose thirty days apparently because that 
is the time that Exhibit "A" gave to the Appellant in 
which to perform after a breach had occurred. Para-
graph 10 of Exhibit "A," reads as follows: 
"In the event the purcha.ser shall fail to make 
payments aforesaid or any of them when the same 
shall become due or within thirty days thereafter 
the vendor shall at its option be released from .all 
obligations in law and equity to convey or deliver 
any property still held in escrow and all payments 
which have been made theretofore on this contract 
by the purchaser shall be forfeited to the vendor 
.as payment for property delivered and as liqui-
dated damages for the non-conformance of the 
balance of the contract." 
There has never been any doubt about the time for 
performance by Appellant having lapsed and .also that 
all the time granted to him by the Extension Agreement, 
Exhibit 10, had lapsed at the time of trial. I I i ~ perform-
ance is now long overdue. 
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During the whole trial Appellant took the position 
that he had always been ready, willing and able to per-
form under the terms of the agreement and make the 
payments that were due thereunder. His attorney, in 
fact, Lucy Deluke, stated that Deluke has been able, ready 
and willing to pay up the deficiencie.s on the contract 
upon performance by the plaintiff. She stated without 
equivocation that he was so ready at the time of trial 
(R. 290). 
If he was ready, willing and able at the time of trial 
to make the payments the fact that the Court gave him 
only thirty days after performance on the part of Respon-
dents to make the payments certainly should create no 
hardships. 
The Trial Court had in mind the fact that Appellant 
had received from Respondent. Deer Trail, 55,000 shares 
of Rainbo Gold 1\:fines Corporation stock, and an assign-
ment of accounts receivable from Rainbo in the sum of 
$25,000.00. If the accounts receivable are accepted at 
their face value and the stock which had already been 
delivered is valued lOc per share, then there has been 
delivered to Appellant $30,500.00 worth of property and 
for that property he has paid only the sum of $15,050.00. 
The equities are on the side of the Respondents. The 
Trial Court Judgment is fair and cause.s no loss or for-
feiture of any of the property which rightfully belonged 
to the Appellant. 
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It is respectfully submitted that this Court shoul~ I 
affirm the Decree of the Lower Court. j 
_ ..... 
CONCLUSIONS 
It is respectfully submitted that the Trial Court~- - 7 
entered a Judgment which is in all respects f.air, equi- f 
table and lawful and that his Findings of Fact are sup- / 
ported by substantial evidence, his Conclusions of Law 
are in accordance with law and the Judgment does justice 
between the parties and should be affirmed by this 
I 
I 
Honorable Court. ~" n~ .... _J 
Respectfully submitted, 
KING and HUGHES 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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Received ........................ copies of the foregoing Brief 
this .......................... day of .................................... , 1957 
Attorney for Appellant. 
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